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Barriers to the Establishment of a
Deterministic Criminal Law
By SmNl

J. KAPLAN*

D ESPITE THE compelling appeal of a criminal law based upon a
deterministic framework, there are considerations which suggest
caution.' Several of these considerations have to do with the
functional value of the traditional framework in maintaining
social control. Still others are of a practical kind and are noteworthy because they point up the concrete problems which stand
in the way of any immediate implementation of a criminal law
founded upon a framework of determinism.2 While both the practical and theoretical "barriers" to a "rational" legal framework demand appraisal, only the theoretical "barriers" will be examined
within the scope of this paper.
In what sense, then, can the "legal fiction" and the "metaphysical jargon"3 of moral responsibility function to maintain
social control? And in what sense might determinism hinder the
maintenance of social control?
One of the more astute rationales for the retention of moral
4
responsibility is to be found in the writings of Thurman Arnold.
Even though Arnold recognizes the scientifically indefensible
"folklore" of responsibility and its trappings, he nonetheless argues
for its "wisdom" on pragmatic grounds. According to Arnold, the
"folklore" of responsibility serves as a system of integrating values
* Ph.D., State College of Washington, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Kentucky.
I See Sidney J. Kaplan, "Criminal Responsibility," 45 Ky. L.J. 236 (1956-57).
2 Some of these "practical" barriers are (1)

gaps in scientific knowledge, (2)

safeguarding individual rights, (3) lack of traine personnel, (4) expense, (5)
political and legal resistance, and (6) public resistance.
3 See Henry Weihofen, "The Metaphysical Jargon of the Criminal Law," 22
A.B.A.J.
267-270 (1936).
4
Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government (1935). For an appraisal of
Arnold's position see Warren P. Hill, "The Psychological Realism of Thurman
Arnold," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377-396 (1955).
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which functions to maintain a stable moral order. Among the
Navaho, for example, the very important curing chants serve to
lend security to a hazardous and ephemeral existence. Even
though the curing chants, calculated to prevent or cure disease,
do not do so, they are nevertheless of marked value in maintaining
social stability by reaffrming cherished ideals, lending meaning
and continuity to life, developing social rapport, and by providing
an outlet for aggressions and other socially dysfunctional tensions.' In short, despite the "nonsense" or "mythology" of the
Navaho curing chants, very important functions attach to them.
Scientific validity, then, is quite irrelevent. What is significant, is
that the chants are socially functional.
It is not without meaning to American society to note that
when the anthropologist appraises the problems of Navaho acculturation he recommends gradualistic policies to mitigate the
possible effects of social disorganization. Similarly, in appraising
the relationship between the "folklore" of moral responsibility
and science, Arnold simply acknowledges that the legal institution is most effective when it keeps peace with public morality.
Indeed, he goes further by suggesting that the nature of public
morality is such that too great an incorporation of sciences may
be incompatible with the social welfare. Were the doubt and
skepticism of science introduced into the criminal law "it would
tend to undermine the popular faith in legal order and certainty."'
As Arnold so persuasively argues:
It is child's play for the realist to show that the law is not
what it pretends to be and that its theories are sonorous
rather than sound; that its definitions run in circles; that applied by skillful attorneys in the forum of the courts it can
only be an argumentative technique; that it constantly
seeks escape from reality through alternate reliance on
ceremony and verbal confusion. Yet the legal realist falls
into a grave error when he believes this to be a defect in
the law. From any objective point of view the escape of
the law from reality constitutes not its weakness but its
greatest strength. . . . If judicial institutions became too
"sincere," too self-analytical, they suffer the fate of ineffectiveness which is the lot of all self-analytical people."
5 See Clyde Kluckholm and Dorathea Leighton, The Navaho 159-181 (1948).
6 Hill, op. cit. supra at 380.
7 Arnold, op. cit. supra at 44.
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Thus a framework of responsibility embracing a court dispensing "justice" provides for a dramatic reaffirmation of social
ideals. The punishment given the criminal serves to give society
the assurance that the good life is worth living, that good triumphs over evil, and that he who obeys the law will win society's
rewards. The moral backdrop of praise and blame, reward and
punishment, then, provides an integrating principle around which
society may orient itself. Thus, ".... the fear of punishment is not

the significant value in punishment but rather the legal sentiments, legal conscience, or moral feelings which have developed
in the general public by the administration of the criminal law
by the previous generations, and which have become so organized
that they regulate behavior spontaneously almost like an instinct."8
But one need not embrace Arnold's extreme "psychological
realism" to acknowledge that the framework of moral responsibility and its concomitants may serve socially desirable ends. For
instance, it may be maintained with some social-psychological
justification that punishment tends to restore the community's
sense of social solidarity. The criminal act, then, makes for a
psychic disequilibrium and the punishment acts as a catharsis
which reinstitutes society's integrity.
2
The specific psychological mechanisms which operate to restore society's sense of integrity have been dealt with at length.9
Even though some theorists deplore the "irrationality" of the
criminal law and its catering to "primitive impulses," they nonetheless indicate that public morality at a given time may require
appropriate psychological outlets. Alexander and Staub, for example, suggest that only at such time as the general masses
recognize the nature of their "irrational impulses" toward the
criminal, will a change in the criminal law be possible.
...

[O]nly then will the general sense of justice change suf-

ficiently to be in harmony with rational measures to be
8 Edwin H. Eutherland and Donald Cressey, Principles of Criminology 291
(1955). This appraisal is ascribed to A. V. Lundstedt, Superstition or Rationality
_
in Action For Peace? (1925).
9 See Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub, The Criminal, The judge and One
Public, particularly at 207-225 (1931). See also John C. Flugel, Man, Morals
and Society (1945).
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undertaken against the criminal; and will give up its demand for the gratification of irrational emotions.' 0
But what are these "irrational impulses" in the criminal law and
in what sense are they linked with social order? In appraising the
punitive aspects of the criminal code, Alexander and Staub have
pointed up three functions of punishment which in part derive
from unconscious motivations." These functions are to be understood in relation to expiation, retaliation, and aggression.
Why does society demand expiation of the criminal? "To put
it in psychoanalytic language, the failure to punish an offender
means a threat to our own repressive trends."1 2 Thus, the criminal
commits an act which members of society forbid themselves. If
the offender is not punished for doing what "good citizens" would
themselves like to do but inhibit, anxiety is evoked.
We may say, then, that what creates the public demand for
atonement is one's own anxiety lest his own Super Ego be
overturned and one's own impulses, which have been curbed3
with so much difficulty, might break through to expression.'
In other words, the imposition of a criminal sentence serves to
reinforce the Super-Ego demands of the law-abiding citizen. The
demand for expiation by punishment, then, functions less for the
criminal than it does for the general public. "By punishing him
we are not only showing him that he can't 'get away with it,'
but holding him up as a terrifying example to our own tempted
and rebellious selves."1 4 What the public obtains from the punishment is proof that it is law-abiding. The public's inhibition of its
own anti-social impulses is thus vindicated through the punishment of the criminal.
Revenge (retribution) may also function to restore social
equilibrium. When the criminal commits a crime he threatens
the security of one's person. "While the demand that a transgression be expiated serves as a protection against our identification
with the violator of the law, the impulse to revenge serves as a
self defense against our enemies." 5 Now even though retaliation
10 Alexander and Staub, op. cit. supra at 212.
11
1 2 Id. at 209ff. Compare Flugel, op. cit. supra at 169.
Alexander and Staub, op. cit. supra at 213.
13 Id. at 214.
14 Flugel, op. cit. supra at 169.
15 Alexander and Staub, op. cit. supra at 220.
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may not in fact be protective for society, it may still, however,
from the viewpoint of the "psychoeconomics" of mental life, reduce the tension which the crime (attack) aroused. In short, the
retribution functions to maintain the integrity of the individual
in a secure world by providing a kind of psychological closure.
Thus the myth of protection, one might whimsically add, is not a
myth.
A third function of a punitive criminal law has to do with
aggression. As Flugel puts it, ".... the criminal provides an outlet for our (moralized) aggression. In this respect, he plays the
same role as our enemies in war and political scapegoats in time
of peace."18 Such aggressions, then, as are called up in the dayto-day struggle for existence, and which are not socially acceptable, may be channelized in a socially acceptable manner through
the medium of criminal punishment. While punishment is by no
means the sole vehicle for the ventilation of aggression, it does
permit expression which might otherwise be socially "dysfunctional."
According to Alexander and Staub, these "three unconscious,
affective sources of the institution of punishment . . . present
serious obstacles to the development of a purely rational criminal
law."' Moreover, they add, "We must make clear that we consider human society still very distant from the realization of this
8
ideal state."1
In addition to the foregoing arguments for a punitive criminal
law, further justification is often attached to its deterrence value.
Despite a large literature which shows a lack of relationship between punishment and deterrence there is, nonetheless, acknowledgement of the "general" deterrent effects of a punitive criminal
law. Sutherland and Cressey, for example, offer the following
pertinent comment:
In a broader perspective, the criminal law and its application by police and courts probably have great effects upon
public morality. Although specific severe punishments may
have little immediate demonstrable effect in deterring specific criminals the existence of the penal code with its penal

16 Flugel,

op. cit., supra at 169.
17 Alexander and Staub, op. cit., supra at 222.

18 Ibid
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sanctions probably has a long-run deterrent effect upon the
development of criminalistic ideologies. By means of the
criminal law and the procedures for implementing the criminal law, including the imposition of swift and certain punishments, the undesirability and impropriety of certain behavior is emphasized.1
One may raise the question, however, of how this general deterrence operates. In other words, how is the impetus "not to do
wrong" incorporated by the individual, and how is it maintained
in the general public which does not commit crimes? This is a
question of enormous significance.
De Grazia maintains with considerable confidence that
"Criminal punishment obtains its clearest justification from its
deterrent effect upon the potential criminal."20 The deterrent
function of punishment, he asserts, has its origin in the early development of the individual. Associated with the formation of the
Super Ego is the development of guilt and its assuagement by
punishment. Thus, "It cannot, then, be surprising to find wrong
and punishment merged in the mind of man as an equation requiring punishment for every crime. The retributive aspect of
punishment has its roots deep in the psyche of man."21
Furthermore, adds de Grazia, in our contemporary society
where the boundaries of what is "wrong' varies so widely, the
Super Ego's demands are weak. In such instances the Super Ego
must be necessarily reinforced by the threat and imposition of
punishment. For many people who may be disposed to commit
a crime, the threat of punishment serves as a restraining force.
Says de Grazia:
Most people deviate to some degree from the morality prescribed by society due to the presence of a faulty superego
structure, i.e., "criminal superego." The superego being
somewhat out of line with the social morality, the sanction
of punishment is necessary to subdue the license otherwise
given to the anti-social impulses not condemned by the
superego. ...

The superego dictates provide the founda-

tion, placing an internal stigma on most criminal activity;
the legal threat of punishment bolsters this stigma by promSutherland and Cressey, op. cit., supra at 289.
Edward de Grazia, "Crime Without Punishment: A Psychiatric Conundrum," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 755 (1952).
39

20

21 Id.

at 756.
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ising punishment where the superego is deficient. Together
these internal and external threats of retribution
operate to
22
deter the universal "criminal" impulse.
It may also be argued that deterrence is linked to the public
concept of justice. Justice and morality, suggests de Grazia, are
founded upon a balance of crime and punishment. "Right begets
reward; wrong begets punishment." 3 Since this conception of
justice has been incorporated by the individual, he will be resent24
ful if "the wrongs of another are not greeted with punishment."
In circumstances when the individual during his early socialization had been "good" parental approval had been as a reward.
On the other hand, when the individual had been "bad" he
learned that parental disapproval (punishment) would be forthcoming. In short, given such a psychological base stemming from
early socialization, a sense of injustice will develop unless "moral
expectations" are realized. Justice, then, demands either reward
or punishment. In Flugel's words, "Our whole notion of justice is
threatened when we observe that a criminal has gone unpunished."25
Were not the public's sense of justice continuously sustained
by punishment (and reward), it is claimed, social disorganization
might ensue. De Grazia, overdramatically perhaps, maintains
that this sense of justice must be continuously reinforced lest
society be reduced to chaos. In de Grazia's words:
Here, then, is justification in a most realistic form for punitive-retributive theory of punishment. Who would dare
gauge the mass conscience deterioration and the increase in
crime which would follow public awareness that the criminal goes unpunished? Who would care to calculate the
spread among the public of the criminal edict, "If he does
it, why should not we?" were criminal punishment abolished? And who could contemplate the resulting social disorder, if not the public conscience were thuis abused,
but
26
the external threat of punishment were removed?
Now while this analysis may appear unduly aIarmist, some
social disorder might not be completely outside the realm of possibility. In any event, the possibility itself would appear to de22

Id. at 759-760.

24
Tbid.
2
0 De Grazia, op. cit. supra at 762.

23 Id.
25

at 760.
Flugel, op. cit. supra at 169-170.
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mand, if changes in the criminal law were contemplated, gradual
implementation.
4
Quite commonly, arguments (or explanations) for the retention
of a punitive criminal law, such as those offered above, are called
rationalizations for vengeance. Weihofen, for example, says, "...
these retribution theories appear as mere armchair sublimations
by kindly and intellectual philosophers of a primitive and vindictive law-an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth."27 Other
critics, however, are less kind to the "apologists" for retribution.28
But one might well ask upon what grounds are these retribution theories called rationalizations? One might conceivably call
the anti-retribution arguments rationalizations for humanitarianism even though they are usually couched in the terminology of
science.
When one examines the assertion that punishment is retribution, and for that reason primitive and undesirable, one is hard
put to understand why the argument stops there. What, after all,
is retribution? Can it not be reduced further psychologically? Is
its meaning exhausted in "an instinct to strike back"? Or can it
not be claimed that retribution serves some psychological end
which, even though at the expense of the individual, may possibly be salutary for society? So at least argue the responsibilitypunitive theorists.
Similarly with regard to deterrence, Barnes and Teeters say,
for example, that deterrence "....

is simply a derived rationaliza-

tion of revenge . . . [Tihe apologists for the punitive regime are
likely to bring forward in their argument the more sophisticated,
but equally futile, contention that punishment deters from
CriMe."

29

But why, one may ask "derived rationalization"? Why "sophisticated"., Why "futile"? Despite the fact that deterrence may
not operate "specifically," is it sophisticated, or futile, or a rationalization to argue that punishment may have a general deterrent
effect? The fact that behavior is "determined" does not militate
against deterrence. It rather supports it since what has led to an
27
Henry
28

Weihofen, Mental Disorder As A Criminal Defense 484 (1954).
See, for example, Harry E. Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, "New Horizons
In Criminology," chap. xvi (1951).
29 Id. at 337.
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inhibition of the criminal act in the general public may well be
the incorporation of the moral framework of right and wrong,
reward and punishment, during early socialization.3 0 The statistics on the failure of punishment as a deterrence do not at all
preclude this possibility."'
If the foregoing observations are sound, perhaps the label
"rationalization" may be a misnomer. A more appropriate label
for these theories of punishment may be "rationale."
Summary
While determinism as a framework for the criminal law appears to be scientifically more defensible than a framework of
moral responsibility, there are a number of considerations which
suggest, even were establishment of a deterministic penal code
immediately possible, a policy of gradualism.
Some of the "barriers" to a deterministic criminal law relate to
the "functional value" of the concept of personal responsibility.
Still others have to do with the psychological outlets that a punitive criminal law provides, the contemporaneous level of public
morality, the concept of justice, and the deterrent value of a
punitive penal code.
Whether or not theories of punishment are rationalizations or
sound rationales appears to be, for the most part, a matter of assertion. Since, in the conflict between the individual and society,
the protection of society is the primary consideration, any recommendations for the establishment of a deterministic criminal law
should be tempered with the acknowledgement that (1) the
traditional framework of moral responsibility may in many respects be socially advantageous, and (2) that a framework of
determinism may have consequences of a deleterious nature.
. Compare Robert A. Fearey, "Concept of Responsibility," 45 J.Crim. L.,
C. and P. S.,25 (May-June, 1954). Says Fearey,
"The on-balance good behavior of the majority of men is not due to
desire for praise and reward or to fear of blame and punishment but
to the discovery over the course of human history that 'proper' living,
in a cooperative rather than selfish relationship to one's fellow men,
is most conducive to happiness."
To this writer this observation seems to be a singularly naive view of "human
nature" and social control.
81 Supra note 21.
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